

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

EB-03 IO-03 L-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 EA-06 /047 W

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P R 232041Z JAN 76

FM USMISSION OECD PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 0257

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 OECD PARIS 02315

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: EGEN, OECD, CIEC

SUBJECT: CIEC: HARMONIZATION OF DC POSITIONS

1. LATENT PROBLEM WHICH WE HAVE FLAGGED IN PAST OF  
POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN ATTEMPT AT COORDINATION OF  
EC POSITIONS IN BRUSSELS AND ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE  
BROADER HARMONIZATION OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY  
POSITIONS IN OECD HAS NOW SURFACED CLEARLY AND POSES  
SERIOUS TACTICAL PROBLEM FOR US.

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2. EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS APPROVED MODALITIES FOR

COORDINATION OF EC POSITIONS WHICH RELEGATE FOUR OECD BACKSTOPPING GROUPS TO EXCHANGE OF VIEWS QTE TO INFORM OTHERS OF POSITIONS UNQTE (QUOTED PHRASE INCLUDED IN INSTRUCTION FROM BRUSSELS TO EC REP TO OECD). REPRESENTATIVE OF COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS INSIST CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION OF POSITIONS WITH OTHER DC PARTICIPANTS IN CIEC DIALOGUE TAKE PLACE BILATERALLY WITH US AND JAPAN SEPARATELY (AS ORTOLI IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD VAN LENNEP RECENTLY) OR IN G-8.

3. THIS RAPIDLY HARDENING POSITION WAS APPARENTLY BEHIND EC FUN AND GAMES ON SCENARIO FOR SELECTION OF CIEC PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, AS USEC PERCEPTIVELY COMMENTED AT THE TIME. IT HAS ALREADY SURFACED IN TWP MEETING JUST CONCLUDED IN WHICH THERE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE (NOT COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL) OF EC COMMISSION AND PRESIDENCY SEEKING TO AVOID COMMITMENT ON TRYING TO HARMONIZE OECD POSITION FOR CIEC FINANCIAL COMMISSION. IT MAY CREATE DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES RE FORTHCOMING OECD HIGH LEVEL GROUPS ON COMMODITIES AND DEVELOPMENT. FROM PARTIAL INDICATIONS IT MAY ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT IEA GB DELIBERATIONS NEXT WEEK AND SUBSEQUENT ROLE OF THAT BODY AS COORDINATOR OF DC POSITIONS IN ENERGY DIALOGUE.

4. WHILE WE DEFER TO USEC ON INTERPRETATION OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, OBVIOUS MOTIVATION IS TO KEEP EC MEMBER COUNTRIES IN LINE IN NEBULOUS AREAS INVOLVED IN DIALOGUE WHERE TREATY OF ROME HAS NOT EXPLICITLY ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES TO COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AND WHERE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ITSELF HAS BEEN MEAGER AT BEST. IN SENSE THIS DECISION REPRESENTS FIRST REAL ATTEMPT TO REINSTATE EC DISCIPLINE SHATTERED DURING WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE. TECHNIQUES AND MODALITIES TO BE EMPLOYED ARE AIMED AT KEEPING MEMBER COUNTRIES IN BACK ROW AND TO EXTENT POSSIBLE OUT OF THE ROOM WHILE COMMUNITY REPS SEEK TO DEAL WITH US AND JAPAN SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER IN G-8 ON KEY ISSUES OF DIALOGUE. INTRINSIC WEAKNESS

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OF COMMUNITY DUE TO WIDE-RANGING NATIONAL DIFFERENCES ON  
THE ISSUES IS BEHIND DELIBERATE SHUNNING OF OECD FORUM.

5. DESPITE POSSIBILITIES OFFERED BY SUPPLEMENTARY  
PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO OECD CONVENTION FOR COMMUNITY TO PARTI-  
CIPATE AS SUCH IN ANY WAY IT CHOOSES, BRUSSELS INSTI-  
TUTIONS FEAR NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS OF MEMBER STATES WILL  
ALWAYS SPEAK UP AT OECD MEETINGS, NOT INFREQUENTLY TAKING  
LINE AT VARIANCE WITH EC MANDATE. UNLIKE GATT, THIS IS  
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THE TRADITION IN OECD. FOR THIS REASON BRUSSELS HAS  
DELIBERATELY DOWNGRADED ITS REPRESENTATION HERE AND CITES

THIS AS EXCUSE FOR WEAK PERFORMANCE IN OECD.

6. FOR FUNDAMENTAL LONG-RANGE POLICY REASONS WE CAN HAVE NO QUARREL WITH A NEW DETERMINATION BY THE COMMUNITY TO ACT AS A UNIT IN IMPORTANT NEW AREA OF NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS. THE EC'S NEW DETERMINATION MAY ALSO BE A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD IN TERMS OF THE DIALOGUE ITSELF. SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE MAY CONCEIVABLY EVEN LEAD TO EXPANDED COMMON EC ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LDCS. IN THIS SENSE THE COMMUNITY MAY BECOME A MORE VALID PARTNER ON OUR SIDE OF OF THE DIALOGUE.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, NEW EC MODALITIES INVOLVE SOME RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES FOR US, VIZ.:

-- EC POSITIONS WILL BE HAMMERED OUT IN DIFFICULT INTERNAL PROCESS WHICH WILL IN PRACTICE NOT BE SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT ADAPTATION IN CONSULTATION PROCESS WITH US AND OTHER DCS.

-- MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS WITH EC WILL BE MADE DIFFICULT BY ABSENCE OF KEY DECISION-MAKERS (I.E. THE MAIN POLICY MAKERS OF COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS). WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE CONSTANTLY ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE EC POSITIONS IN THE MAKING IN BRUSSELS AND IN CAPITALS, BUT WE ARE LIKELY TO FIND OURSELVES TRYING TO CATCH UP WITH AND MODIFY COMMUNITY POSITIONS AS THEY DEVELOP (AS FREQUENTLY HAPPENS IN TRADE FIELD) RATHER THAN HAVE COMMUNITY TRY TO CATCH UP WITH POLICIES EVOLVED IN FORUM IN WHICH WE DOMINATE DISCUSSION.

-- TO EXTENT EC SUCCEEDS IN ESTABLISHING PATTERN OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON CIEC WITH OTHER DCS IN BRUSSELS AT EXPENSE OF MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS (AND WE KNOW OF COMMISSION ATTEMPT TO SET UP CHANNELS OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON CIEC WITH CANADA AND JAPAN) US WILL BE DEPRIVED OF ADVANTAGE OF INFLUENCING EC POSITIONS BY LINING UP  
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SUPPORT OF OTHER DC PARTICIPANTS IN A MULTILATERAL FORUM, NOTABLY JAPAN. ADVANTAGE WOULD SHIFT TO THE COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH OTHER DCS ONE BY ONE.

-- TO EXTENT THAT UNDER NEW MODALITIES EC POSITIONS ARE LESS SUBJECT TO US INFLUENCE, THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE AT SUBSTANTIVE VARIANCE WITH US APPROACHES. THE COMMUNITY MAY HAVE DEVELOPED OR AT LEAST CHANGED CONSIDERABLY SINCE AN EMINENT

EXPERT ON THE EC ANNOUNCED THAT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY THE COMMISSION AND FRANCE CONSTITUTE A MAJORITY. ON THE OTHER HAND HISTORICAL OBSERVATION WOULD CONFIRM THAT POSITIONS WHICH EMERGE FROM THE INTERNAL EC PROCESS ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE INFLUENCED BY THE GERMAN MARKET ORIENTED PHILOSOPHY THAN BY THE FRENCH DIRIGISTE APPROACH.

-- IT IS HOWEVER ALSO POSSIBLE THAT EC POSITIONS REPRESENTING LABORIOUSLY COMPROMISED VIEWS BETWEEN SUCH EXTREMES AS THE GERMAN AND FRENCH VIEWS ON COMMODITIES WILL BE BLAND, VAGUE MANDATES OR MERELY TACTICAL HOLDING POSITIONS, WHICH TAKEN TOGETHER WITH JAPAN'S TRADITIONAL RETICENCE OR WAFFLING IN DISCOURSE WITH LDC'S, WILL LEAD TO US TAKING MOST OF HEAT IN DIALOGUE.

-- FINALLY A PROCESS WHICH EXCLUDES THE OECD AS CLEARLY AS THE EC WOULD LIKE WOULD DEPRIVE THE POSITIONS OF THE US AND THE OTHER DC PARTICIPANTS IN CIEC DIALOGUE OF THE LEGITIMACY OF AN OECD-WIDE CONSENSUS, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH ALL INTERESTED INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AND GROUNDED IN SOLID STAFF WORK BY A COMPETENT SECRETARIAT.

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P R 232041Z JAN 76

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8. IN SUM, WHILE WE CANNOT QUESTION THE ATTEMPT BY EC TO TRY TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE IN CIEC DIALOGUE, MODALITIES DEvised BY BRUSSELS TO COPE WITH WEAKNESS OF COMMUNITY STEMMING FROM WIDE-RANGING DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST AND APPROACH OF MEMBER STATES, APPEAR TO US VERY LIKELY TO HAVE DISADVANTAGE OF REDUCING OUR ABILITY TO LEAD THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY SIDE IN THE DIALOGUE AND RISK SERIOUS WEAKENING OF OVERALL G-8 POSITIONS.  
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9. EC SPOKESMEN ARE OF COURSE CORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT TO QTE COORDINATE UNQTE POSITIONS IN OECD BACKSTOPPING GROUPS (ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN A CLEAR ALBEIT UNRECORDED AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE POSITIONS IN IEA), OR THAT G-8 OR G-5'S IN ANY WAY REPRESENT THE OECD. THERE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL BACKSTOPPING GROUPS WOULD TRY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE HARMONIZATION OF SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS WHICH IMPLIES CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN LATEST BRUSSELS FORMULA. NEGOTIATING HISTORY IN OECD MINISTERIAL MEETING, XCSS AND IN IEA GIVES US (AS WELL AS OTHER KEY NON-EC PARTICIPANTS IN DIALOGUE) BASIS FOR HOLDING STEADY TO COURSE WE HAVE DEVELOPED TO DATE.

11. THIS IMPLIES THE NEED FOR A CLEAR CONCEPT OF WHAT WE INTEND TO DO IN THE VARIOUS CHANNELS AND FORA AND MAKING CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED:

A -- THAT WE DO NOT CHALLENGE OR PROTEST RECENT EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECISION AND EVEN LAUD DETERMINATION OF EC TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE;

B -- THAT WE INDICATE BOTH IN BRUSSELS (EC) AND PARIS (OECD/IEA/G-8) AND IN CAPITALS THAT WE CONTINUE TO SEEK MAXIMUM POSSIBLE HARMONIZATION OF DC POSITIONS FOR CIEC COMMISSIONS, THROUGH INTENSIVE USE OF IEA AND THE THREE OECD BACKSTOPPING GROUPS (WE NEED NOT DIFFERENTIATE DEGREE OF HARMONIZATION AS AMONG BACKSTOPPING GROUPS ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY WE WILL AIM FOR VIRTUALLY COMMON POSITIONS IN IEA).

C -- THAT WE CONTINUE AS BEFORE TO INFORM BRUSSELS AND CAPITALS OF EC MEMBER STATES (AS WELL AS OTHER OECD CAPITALS AS APPROPRIATE) OF US POSITIONS AS THEY DEVELOP BUT GUARD AGAINST SLIPPING INTO PATTERN OF ALLOWING CONVERSATIONS ON US POSITIONS TO BE CONSIDERED CONSULTATIONS. WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT SEEK MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT OF POSITIONS IN THESE CONTACTS AND SHOULD SEEK CLEARLY TO LINK THESE BILATERAL APPROACHES TO FORTHCOMING MEETINGS OF BACKSTOPPING

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GROUPS WHERE, WE SHOULD REPEATEDLY MAKE CLEAR, HARMONIZATION OF POSITIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

D -- WE SHOULD DEFLECT ATTEMPTS BY EC TO DISCUSS CIEC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, INCLUDING LINKAGE QUESTIONS IN G-8, WHETHER G-8 CAUCUSES CALLED BY CANADIANS OR DE FACTO G-8 CAUCUSES (G-5 PLUS AUDITORS CALLED BY DC CO-CHAIRMAN), AND WE SHOULD TAKE FIRM VIEW THAT CONFERENCE-WIDE ISSUES APPROPRIATE TO G-8 SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY LIMITED TO ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS; AND THAT G-8 CAUCUSES CONVENED BY CO-CHAIRMAN SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND TACTICAL QUESTIONS DUE TO COME UP IN COURSE OF COMMISSION MEETING.

E -- WE SHOULD WHENEVER POSSIBLE USE MEETINGS OF BACKSTOPPING GROUPS TO ADVANCE SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS ON POSITIONS FOR DIALOGUE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF EC PROCESS, IN THIS WAY DOMINATING INTERNAL EC DISCUSSION. WE SHOULD NOT BE DISCOURAGED IF EC IS NOT READY TO RESPOND IN TIMELY FASHION IN BACKSTOPPING GROUPS, ESCHEW EC ATTEMPTS AT LAST MINUTE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SEEKING TO ADJUST POSITIONS AND EXPRESS WILLINGNESS CALL SUBSEQUENT BACKSTOPPING GROUP MEETINGS.

F -- WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR BY OUR PREPARATIONS FOR AND REPRESENTATION (ROBINSON WITH APPROPRIATE HIGH-LEVEL INTER-AGENCY BACKING), THAT WE INTEND TO DISUCSS

OVERALL POLICY ISSUES IN XCSS AND DEVELOP USEFUL  
INFORMAL BUREAU THAT INVOLVES A FEW TOP-LEVEL  
NATIONAL POLICY-MAKERS AS WELL AS COMMISSION REPS.  
WE SHOULD NOT BE DISCOURAGED BY LOWER-LEVEL COMMIS-  
SION REPRESENTATION.

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G -- FINALLY, IF CUMBERSOME EC PROCEDURES RESULT IN



DELAYS IN ADOPTION OF EC POSITION WE SHOULD NOT  
HESITATE TO ADVANCE POSITIONS ON OUR OWN IN COM-  
MISSIONS MOBILIZING AS MUCH SUPPORT IN BACKSTOPPING  
GROUPS AND CARRYING AS MANY OF OTHERS AMONG G-5 AS  
POSSIBLE. THIS IS ADVANTAGE TO US OF NO FORMAL  
DECISION TO QTE COORDINATE UNQTE POSITIONS IN OECD  
BACKSTOPPING GROUPS. ON OTHER HAND, WE SHOULD NOT  
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HESITATE TO LET COMMISSION WORK SIMMER WHEN THIS IS  
IN OUR INTEREST AND LET EC TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY.

11. IN CONCLUSION, SINCE THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFER-  
ENCE, WE HAVE ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH IN OUR  
RELATIONSHIP WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE BROAD  
AREA OF NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE SOME  
VALUABLE INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN OECD AND IN IEA  
WHICH SUITS OUR INTEREST IN THE DIALOGUE. DUE TO THE  
SECRETARY'S INITIATIVES, WE ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED ORGAN-  
IZERS AND INTELLECTUAL SPARK-PLUGS OF CIEC. WE HOLD  
THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE KEY ENERGY COMMISSION. MANY  
ELEMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS THE FINANCIAL OFFI-  
CIALS AT TWP THIS WEEK WILL CHAFE AT BEING GAGGED. THE  
US, WITH ROBINSON'S TIRELESS EFFORTS, HAS DOMINATED  
THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DIALOGUE ON THE DEVELOPED  
COUNTRY SIDE ON ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE  
ISSUES. WE NEED NOT ACCEPT A SYSTEM THAT UNDERMINES  
THIS LEADERSHIP BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY IS INTERNALLY  
WEAK OR BECAUSE THE BUREAUCRATIC APPARATUS IN BRUSSELS  
MAY BE ENVOUS OF THE ACTIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE  
HERE AND ELSEWHERE. WE CAN STAY STEADY ON OUR COURSE,  
ACCEPT THE EC'S DETERMINATION TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE  
BUT MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS ENTAILS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF  
THE COMMUNITY TO CONSULT AND SEEK TO HARMONIZE ITS  
COMMON POSITIONS WITH THOSE OF OTHER DEVELOPED COUN-  
TRIES IN THE APPROPRIATE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK, AND THAT  
THAT FRAMEWORK FOR THE CURRENT NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IS  
THE OECD.  
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## Message Attributes

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